Andrew Robinson / Work / Security & Governance

UKG Security
& Access Governance

From informal requests to a controlled, auditable, and scalable security governance capability

Type Governance & security
Stack UKG · Forms · Power Automate · SharePoint
Partners HR · Payroll · IT · Business owners
Implemented · 2026
Problem
Access granted through email, Teams, and tribal knowledge
Approach
Hybrid role model + one governed request-to-audit workflow
Impact
Clear ownership · No self-approval · Central audit trail
The starting point

Access had grown up informally,
one request at a time

UKG security access had evolved through email threads, Teams messages, and institutional knowledge. There was no standard request and approval workflow, no consistent ownership model, and no single place to see who asked for what, who approved it, and why.

Over time, broad and accumulated roles made it hard to tell baseline job access apart from specialized capabilities and approval authority. Each decision was defensible on its own, but taken together the decisions couldn't be explained, reproduced, or reviewed.

Fragmented intake
Requests arrived through email and Teams rather than one controlled channel.
Unclear accountability
Role ownership, approval, and review responsibilities weren't consistently documented.
Broad role design
Baseline access, specialized permissions, and approval authority were bundled together.
Manual decisions
Assignments depended on deep system knowledge and case-by-case interpretation.
Limited audit evidence
Rationale, approvals, and final status weren't retained in one place.
Review complexity
Large permission sets made periodic access validation hard to interpret.
The design

Separate what someone needs
from what someone can approve

The foundation was a hybrid role model. Larger persona-based roles cover predictable baseline access, and smaller add-on roles grant specialized capabilities or decision authority. This keeps least privilege practical: no one needs a custom role, and no one gets approval power just because it came bundled with their job access.

Core role
Primary business persona
Predictable baseline access for a job family. Large, stable, and easy to assign.
Add-on role
Specialized capability
Protected data or a specific function, layered on only where the work requires it.
Approval role
Decision authority
Authority to approve a defined transaction, granted deliberately and reviewed on its own.

The design principle: balance least privilege with manageable administration. Too many tiny roles make governance hard to run, and too few broad roles leave it with nothing to govern.

The solution

One governed path from
request to audit record

I built a practical control layer around security assignment using tools the organization already owned: Microsoft Forms for intake, Power Automate for routing, SharePoint as the governance repository, and UKG as the system of record. Every request now follows the same six steps.

01
Manager submits
Business need and requested access captured through a standard form.
02
Record created
A governance record is created automatically for tracking.
03
Role owner reviews
The accountable business owner validates that the access is appropriate.
04
HRIS reviews
An independent control review happens before anything is implemented.
05
HRIS implements
Approved access is assigned in UKG.
06
Audit retained
The request, decisions, dates, and final result remain in the repository.
Decision points
Before & after

From individual admin decisions
to a repeatable capability

Before
  • Email and Teams requests
  • No standard approval path
  • No single audit record
  • Ownership depended on individual knowledge
  • Access reviews hard to interpret
After
  • One governed request path
  • Role owner and HRIS review
  • Centralized evidence trail
  • Defined ownership and decision rights
  • Governance-ready role catalog
What I delivered

A framework, a process,
and the tooling to run it

🧭
Security governance framework
Future-state architecture, guiding principles, and a transition plan from the current state.
📋
Role catalog
Purpose, intended users, owner, approver, risk tier, review cadence, and separation-of-duties notes for every role.
📝
Manager request portal
A standardized access intake experience built in Microsoft Forms.
⚡
Approval automation
Power Automate routing for role-owner and HRIS decisions, with no manual chasing.
🗄️
Governance repository
A SharePoint record of every request, decision, owner, and status, ready for audit.
🤝
Ownership model
A clear line between business authorization and HRIS control and implementation responsibilities.
What's next

Governance first,
automation second

Standardized roles and documented decisions are what make safe automation possible. With the foundation in place, the roadmap shifts toward scaling the controls:

Lifecycle provisioning
Use validated job attributes to assign core roles predictably for joiners and movers.
Access certification
Periodically confirm that core, add-on, and approval access is still required.
Security analytics
Track request volume, decision status, aging, exceptions, and review activity.
SoD monitoring
Flag role combinations that need to be prohibited or given enhanced review.
Governed exceptions
Handle temporary, sensitive, and emergency access through documented criteria.
Automation expansion
Automate predictable access while keeping elevated capabilities deliberate.
Reflection

Security is a prerequisite,
not a cleanup project

This started as an access cleanup and became the foundation for everything that follows. Every later enhancement, including lifecycle automation, self-service, and new modules, depends on knowing who should have access to what and who is accountable for that decision.

The most useful shift was moving the question from "can HRIS give this person access?" to "who owns this decision, and where is the evidence?" Once ownership is explicit, HRIS stops being the bottleneck for every judgment call and becomes the control point it should be.


Next case study
UKG homepage & UX redesign